

MODERNIZATION OR SOCIAL CHANGE — A REDEFINITION OF CONCEPTS**

M. FRANCIS ABRAHAM*

Modernization is a new word for an old phenomenon: the many-layered all embracing process of social change in the developing areas. Social scientists concerned with modernization have employed advanced, industrialized societies of the West as a standard of reference to which developing societies are compared in an attempt to delineate the processes of change that tend to transform the traditional institutions and values in a way they approximate the Western model of modernity. And it appears that the numerous studies in this area fall into one of four general models of modernization.

1. Structural Models
 - a) Social system model
 - b) Cultural system model
2. Social-Psychological Model
3. Process Model
4. Conflict Model

Social System Model

Smelser (1959), Rostow (1960), Apter (1965), Marion Levy (1966, 1972) Eisenstadt (1966), Netti and Robertson (1968), Hunter (1969) and Huntington (1968) have all used some form of macrosociological approach to explain the process of modernization as it alters and articulates the institutional arrangements, systemic attributes and structural concomitants of a given society. In this approach social system is taken as the unit of analysis and values are relegated to the background.

Smelser (1966) identified four distinct but inter-related processes of modernization in the areas of technology, agriculture, industry and ecological arrangements. Marion Levy (1966) has presented a holistic approach to modernization touching on a whole gamut of structural variables and functional prerequisites which differentiate between relatively modernized and relatively non-modernized societies — a general taxonomy he developed. Rostow's (1960) "Non-Communist Manifesto" lists five stages of economic development through which every society will pass one day or another. He has compressed epochs of economic struggle in the history of nations into a neatly drawn five-stage model of transition that does not extend more than two centuries at the most. Rostow's historical evidence is based on the limited experience of a few countries that constituted a highly homogeneous sample (excluding Japan). His thesis shows several properties of the discredited unilinear evolutionary model: every society will pass through five specific stages of economic growth leading eventually to the golden age of mass consumption. But the economic history of nations does not necessarily support the Rostowian thesis.

Cultural System

The Cultural System model portrays the dynamics of modernization in term of changes in the normative structure of the community. Following the Weberian thesis on protestant ethic and the rise of

* Prof. M. Francis Abraham is Associate Professor of Sociology, Grambling State University, Grambling, Louisiana.

** This Paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Anthropological Society, Atlanta, April 2, 1976.

capitalism, several generations of sociologists have sought to determine a set of cultural values that are crucial to modernization. Of course, these values are the abstracted quintessence of the normative system of modern industrialized societies of the West. Exponents of the model argue that traditional societies can be modernized only by the diffusion of those values and cultural traits that characterize contemporary advanced societies. Hoselitz (1963) used Parsonian pattern variables to differentiate between traditional and modern societies and contend that the former is characterized by the norms of ascription, particularism and emphasize the norms of achievement, universalism and specificity. Lipset (1967:6) considers the combination of universalism and achievement "most favourable to the emergence of an industrial society since it encourages respect of deference towards others on the basis of merit and places emphasis on achievement." Cochran (1959), Fillol (1961), Richard Morse (1958) and Willems (1953) show how strong kinship ties and the tendency to view business property very much like a family estate tend to impede growth of technological efficiency and a rational bureaucracy in Latin America.

It must, however, be pointed out that the exponents of cultural system model have taken the analytical categories of pattern variables too seriously and oversimplified the variegated normative structure of societies by dichotomizing them in bivariate terms. While Granick (1960) and Frank (1969) question the assumption that industrially advanced nations are basically achievement-oriented, Herschman (1965) and Weiner (1966) have convincingly argued

that certain particularistic orientations such as joint family system in India have contributed to successful entrepreneurship and rational bureaucracy.

Moreover, categorization of values into modern and traditional raises a host of theoretical problems. Since the sociologist is eager to avoid making value judgements, he assumes that the values associated with modern societies are modern and those associated with underdeveloped societies are traditional. Now, how do we explain the fact that slavery was prevalent only in civilized societies, while it was unknown to preliterate, primitive societies?¹ Similarly, the "traditional orientation" of an orthodox Hindu is characterized by universalism of the highest order reflected in his religious tolerance and the faith that all religions lead to the same ultimate destination. But the "progressive orientation" of "religious" men in the most senate cultures is characterized by aggressive particularism reflected in their concerted attempts' at proselytizing and conversion. The popularity of local newspapers in the U. S. towns and correspondingly the absence of a community press in the developing societies have significant impact on the value-orientation of people: the average American tends to be a localite in his newspaper exposure whereas the average 'traditional' man is — though not by choice — universally-oriented since his regional newspaper is more national and international than local. The political system in the United States is predominantly particularistic in at least three ways: family tradition of voting preference of individual candidates over political parties and the system of administrative appointments

1. Of course, slavery could be interpreted in terms of rational economic orientation but, then, its absence will have to be explained as a negation of that orientation. Or, it is at least as plausible to contend that every rational orientation is not consistent with the "ethic" of modernity.

which enable elected officials — Mayor or President — to confer political favours on hundreds of thousands of people. In many developing societies which have inherited the British system of parliamentary democracy and civil service administration, candidates are elected on the basis of their party affiliation and administrative positions are filled by an independent agency on the basis of merit. In addition, universities in these societies have a universalistic system of examination and competition whereby examiners from other universities are enabled to determine the final grades of students. These observations are merely intended to show that a blanket label of bivariate value-orientations to differentiate between traditional and modern societies is not always helpful.

Moreover, the advocates of pattern variable analysis occasionally resemble Comte's secular priests in a curious fashion because of their assertion that traditional societies, in order to modernize themselves, must internalize the ethics of modernity characteristic of advanced societies and meticulously follow their footprints. This assertion is a negation of historical reality. A very significant association between certain cultural values and technological progress in Western societies does not necessarily mean that these values are essential prerequisites to the modernization of peasant societies. Lauer (1971) and Fairbank *et al* (1965) show how countries in East Asia which are on the threshold of modernization are at once maintaining and exploiting traditional cultural systems in the wake of development and change. Gerschenkron (1966) suggests the 'principle of substitutability' according to which different sets of values induce or impede social change in different societies depending on their structural situation. Above

all, the so-called traditional values and belief systems are often a symptom of the general backwardness of the society and to explain them as the cause of their backwardness is as erroneous as to think that a man's fever is the cause of his disease.²

Social-Psychological Models

According to this perspective, favorable change in the personality structure of social actors in the *open sesame* to modernization of a given social system. Here the emphasis is on changing life styles, belief systems and personality attributes.

McClelland (1961, 1963) explain not only the dynamics of modernization but also the rise and fall of empires in terms of child-rearing practices which induce or inhibit achievement motivation and consequent entrepreneurial ability leading eventually to national economic development. This theory of modernization involves numerous conceptual and methodological problems. According to McClelland, achievement motivation is inconsistent with the concern for affiliation and for power. In other words, if a man "worries a lot" about his family and friends, or speculates on power, instead of spending his time thinking about doing things better he is low on achievement motivation. This assertion is heavily loaded with the cultural bias of the Western social system where family and kinship ties are weak. Only in highly individualistic societies is it possible to measure achievement motivation in terms of an individual's personal ambitions without reference to his family obligations. Yet Rogers and his associates (Prodipto Roy, Fliegel *et al* 1968, 1969) have used

2. The author is indebted to Davis and Moore for this expression.

such a crude index of achievement motivation in their study of modernization among Indian farmers. They operationalized the concept of achievement motivation on the basis of peasants' responses to three statements of which this one deserves particular mention here: "One should succeed in one's occupation even though one has been neglectful of one's family." Kumar (1970) and this author (1973) used the same data to study the dynamics of modernization in India and found little relationship between n achievement scores and other variables of modernization. In the kinship-centered Indian rural community, the test of an individual's achievement motivation does not lie in his self-seeking or high occupational aspirations at the expense of his family; rather the real test of achievement motivation in the Indian context lies in the extent to which an individual is willing to make sacrifices for the success of his own family. For instance, asking the respondent if he is willing to sell part of his landed property in order to keep his son in college (which many parents do) could provide a better index of one's achievement motivation than asking him if he wanted to succeed in his occupation even though he is neglectful of his family.

Conflict Models

Conflict theories seek to analyze the processes of modernization in terms of descensus, disequilibrium or revolutionary upheavals. Marx is undoubtedly a pioneering theorist of social conflict who developed the evolutionary theory of revolution to explain how various socio-economic systems like feudalism, capitalism and socialism emerge and transform themselves. He made extensive use of class struggle as a tool for the analysis of change

in total societies and argued that the economic system of production and distribution could determine the social, cultural and political structure of the society.

Barrington Moore (1966) has made a seminal contribution to our understanding of change in total societies through a systematic analysis of class antagonisms and class alliances. Moore has sought to identify the historical constellations and structural concomitants which produce or prevent peasant revolutions. And Di Tella (1969:68) has singled out three bases for social revolutionary movements in underdeveloped countries: (1) Elements drawn from the poorly organized urban working class, (2) poorer sections of the peasantry and (3) discontented segments of lower middle class and intelligentsia who constitute an elite of professional revolutionaries. He explains how demonstration effect, revolution of rising expectations and status incongruence produce discontent among various classes leading eventually to types of populist movements.

Despite the few studies reviewed here, the conflict theory is inadequately developed to account for the process and dynamics of change in the developing societies and sociology has not yet developed a generalized conflict model of modernization. But the potentials of a conflict model as a tool for the analysis of modernization cannot be overemphasized. Speaking in broad terms, the areas of conflict in the developing societies could be outlined as follows:

1. Conflict of classes. The landless peasantry, landed aristocracy, commercial and industrial middle classes, incongruent groups among the salaried professionals and bureaucrats, and the political and military elites represent possibilities of re-

volution and counter revolution through expedient alliances and bitter class struggles.

2. Conflict of values. The cultural system of every developing society is a perpetual battle-field where the forces of modernity and tradition meet. The conflict of values creates structural strain, dissensus, disequilibrium, and the erosion — if not the complete breakdown — of some of the old normative structures and facilitates the emergence of new norms and value-orientations.
3. Conflict of personality. The concepts like demonstration effect, revolution of rising expectations, status incongruence, relative deprivation and achievement motivation illustrate variations of personality conflict within the individuals. Educational revolution, gap between aspirations and achievement, conflict of loyalties and the absence of adequate opportunities would increase frustration leading to widespread social discontent.

New theories of social conflict are needed for the meaningful analyses of these conflict areas.

Process Model

Whereas the previous models deal with the relevance of systems, conflict between systems or personality structure for societal change, process model seeks to explain modernization in terms of certain pervasive processes like secularization, communication, industrialization, urbanization and Westernization which set in motion a chain of disruptive consequences in developing countries. The number of studies — empirical investigations as

well as conceptual analyses — undertaken from this perspective is quite large.

One of the most important process model analyses is the communication theory of modernization exemplified in the works of Lerner (1958), Pye (1963), Pool (1967), Rogers (1969), Schram (1964) Lerner and Schram (1967), Deutchmann (1963), Doob (1961) and Frey (1966). Mass communication is deemed to be a catalytic agent in the process of modernization. Rogers (1969:37) has termed mass media as the 'magic multiplier.' "Attendance to the mass media is a broadener of horizons, an informer, and a persuader for change." The conceptual model underlying Rogers' (1969:102) communication theory of modernization is the paradigm that certain antecedents like literacy, education, social status, age and cosmopolitanism are mediated and processually articulated by mass media exposure which transforms these antecedent variables into traits of modernity such as empathy, agricultural and home innovativeness, political knowledge, achievement motivation and educational aspirations.

Srinivas (1966) analyses social change in modern India in terms of four universal processes: Westernization, Sanskritization, Secularization and Politicization. Secularization is, perhaps, the most effective single process underlying Socio-cultural change in developing societies. This assertion is supported by Fals Borda's (1962) evidence from the Colombian rural community and Halperin's (1963 :19) report from the middle East which has witnessed "the disintegration of a "social system founded in God's final word." Whereas Hoselitz and Moore (1963) and Moore (1965) find industrialization as the prime mover of modernization, Breese (1966) treats urbanization as the key to social change in the developing areas. Finally the numerous sociological treatises

that deal with developmental change or planned social change, community development and rural extension may be considered to be variants of the processual model.

Having discussed the various models of modernization, we may now examine some of the general conceptual and methodological shortcomings of these approaches.

In the first place, most of the studies reviewed above tend to define modernization in terms of 'modernity' which is the abstracted quintessence of the Socio-cultural system of the Western industrialized society. Their referent is the ideal-typical 'modern' capitalist society and their model of 'modern' man is every actor in this social system who is the embodiment of rationality. In this curiously one-sided notion of modernity, social change in the developing areas becomes meaningful only insofar as it reflects a motivated emulation of the so-called modern societies and their constituents.

Second, modernization is considered a unilinear or unidirectional process, for developing societies tend to follow the footprints of Western industrialized societies with the hope of being able to join them eventually. Hoselitz (1965:94) visualizes an "economic unification of mankind" which could be attributed "primarily to greater approximation of some of the basic Socio-cultural and psychological attitudes in various countries." Of course, sociologists shun the idea of progress and have rejected Comte's theory of unilinear evolution. The concept of evolution was replaced by that of social change so as to avoid the connotation of progress but today social change is being substituted by modernization. The very notions of evolution and progress once rejected as subjective, value-orientational and unscientific have now

been admitted into the warehouse of modern sociological vocabulary, not through the backdoor in disguise but through the front-door in the plain jargon of modernization which represents a lot of "good" things which industrialized societies have in abundance and which the developing societies are lacking but should have if they are to survive. Moore's (1963:89-90) assertion is typical of this lopsided value-orientation. "What is involved in modernization is a "total" transformation of a traditional or pre-modern society into the types of technology and associated social organization that characterize the "advanced" economically prosperous, and relatively politically stable nations of the Western World. Because so many aspects of the social order in the underdeveloped areas of the world do not conform to the models set by the advanced countries, there is room for improvement in practically any direction one looks."

One of the theoretical consequences of this unidirectional evolutionary model of modernization is the underlying assumption that there is only one safe road to Rome. Whether it is the Rostowian thesis of take-off, communication theory of rural-urban linkage, or pattern variable analysis of value-orientation the implicit assumption is that all developing societies are treading a well defined path. This is absolute negation of historical realities. The advanced, industrialized societies like England and the United States which serve as modernization models have passed through several stages of evolution and revolution and have witnessed the emergence and demise of numerous historical constellations. Colonialism. Laissez-faire creed, protestant ethic, bourgeois revolution, unique class alliances and religious rivalries all produced social disturbances leading to an unplanned

process of modernization. But the newly emerging nationals have in front of them the vast experiences of early modernizers, and the new elites in these countries are working out for themselves a planned path of socio-economic development which would not only constrain the social disturbances experienced by the pioneers but also reduce the social cost of modernization.

Another criticism of most of these theories is their preoccupation with the obstacles to change in developing societies. Sunkel (Veliz, 1969: 116-17) deplores the widespread tendency among students of modernization to treat the process of social change in terms of "a dialectical interplay of two types of antagonistic social forces" — positive and progressive versus negative and reactionary. "This may easily lead to a dogmatic division of the various actors of the social drama into good and bad, as neatly contrasted as black and white."

The fundamental assumption underlying most of the theoretical models of modernization is that the traditional societies resist change because change is disruptive. This assumption — labelled as the fallacy of trauma by Lauer (1971) — is unfounded for several reasons. In the first place, tradition is not all static; nor is change synonymous with revolution — political or technological. Modernity is not what is grafted on to a traditional society from an alien system, but change is ubiquitous and built into any system including the most "proverbial". Secondly, resistance to change is selective and should not be construed to mean that all structural properties associated with the traditional societies inhibit change and those associated with the advanced societies induce change. Rather, we should ask the question: resistance to what change and why? Even in the most

advanced societies intense resistance to change could be identified in certain areas like political ideology, religious beliefs, and the free enterprise creed. All over the world, vast segments of rural population hitherto "unalterably committed" to a life of tradition and status quo have accepted revolutionary ideologies of some kind — populism, democratic socialism, or communism — and have risen in violent rebellion to establish a new social order, whereas the ideology of socialism, the concept of welfare state and even the teaching of Darwinian theory in public schools (at least until recently), were vehemently opposed by sections of people in the most modern society. Thirdly, most treaties on modernization because of their preoccupation with the polar extremes of tradition and modernity, or stagnation and change, have completely overlooked how often traditional societies have silently absorbed the most violent changes and institutionalized them in their structural framework. Srinivas' (1966) discussion of Sanskritization by means of which lower castes in the 'closed' system of stratification gained upward mobility and legitimized their higher status through the ages is an illustration in point. Fals Borda (Veliz, 1969) shows how 'violencia' has become an institutionalized phenomenon in the break-up of tradition in Colombia, and Halpern (1963) explains how the powerful force of consensus based on Islamic tradition in the middle East now asserts itself as a secular force inducing modernization.

While discussing the cultural system model of modernization we have made the point that the dichotomization of values into modern and traditional is one of the most fundamental errors in the analysis of modernization. Let us now expatiate that point a little further. The

general assumption may be stated thus: distinctly different sets of values are associated with developed societies and developing societies; the values associated with the former are based on rationality and they are prerequisites of modernization, whereas the values associated with the developing societies are based on tradition and they impede technological change. Reduced to specificity, the paradigm runs like this: to be modern is to be rational, to be rational is to be Western,³ and therefore, to be modern is to be Western. Tradition and rationality are antithetical; so are rural and urban. This orientation in the contemporary literature on modernization may be termed as ideational antithesis which postulates that the values associated with modern and traditional societies are antithetical and that the latter can modernize only by discarding their own values and internalizing those attributed to modern societies.

The ideational antithesis often reflects the ethnocentric, egoistic perspective of the ideal-typical 'modern man'. Moreover, it is at once a logical and historical fallacy to equate the present conditions prevailing in the modern societies with the prerequisites of modernization for developing societies. Several of the current structural functional characteristics of modern societies were themselves products rather than producers of modernization in these societies. Whereas religious oppression, laissez-faire creed and protestant ethic with its emphasis on asceticism contributed to the socio-economic development of the U.S., they are no longer significant variables in explaining

the current state of modernization. Similarly, although achievement, universalism and specificity are typically characteristic of the contemporary American society, we cannot prove conclusively that they were the same qualities that provided the impulse to modernization in the early stages. On the other hand, there is evidence to indicate that frontier families were ascriptive and particularistic. Granick (1960) and Frank (1969) have convincingly demonstrated how ascription and particularism are still dominant in the economic domain of the present day American society. The assumption that familism is an impediment to economic progress seems untenable when we consider the Jewish family enterprises in the United States and the successful business ventures of various religious communities in India, particularly "Marwari, Jain and Parsi entrepreneurs in India, (who) though committed to family particularism, have impressive records of successful entrepreneurship." (Weiner, 1966:6).

Several studies (of Lerner, 1958; Inkeles, 1969; Rogers, 1969) have concluded that traditionalism is inextricably intertwined with lack of empathy, fatalism and lack of achievement motivation. However, most researchers have taken this association for granted without ever attempting to study whether and to what extent these variables are responsible for underdevelopment. Moreover, operationalization of these variables for cross-cultural analyses has been consistently inconsistent with the cultural realities of the target system. Lerner (1963:332) has termed empathy as the lubricant of modernization and as "the greatest

3. Considering his military strategy and military organization, was not Hitler rational? But it is precisely the rise of Hitler that exploded the myth of the rational model of man. Can we claim, then, that rationality, modernity and 'westernism' are always compatible? Is rationality above all value-orientations? Is the Western man always rational? Or, is it not at least as possible to demonstrate the co-existence of non-rationality and modernity in a given social system or a social actor?

characterological transformation in modern history." But he measured empathy by asking the poor, illiterate peasants of Balgat what they would do if they were the President of Turkey. The question was rejected out of hand by the respondents who could not conceive the possibility of occupying such a role, let alone think of the behaviors expected of the role. But Lerner has jumped to the conclusion that these peasants have very low empathy* and are, therefore, traditionalists, although he has not shown anywhere in his voluminous work any significant relationship between empathy and development. The logic is simple: a significant association between low empathy and tradition is considered adequate proof for a significant negative correlation between low empathy and development and hence empathy is considered the lubricant of modernization. This inverse logic is typical of many studies in modernization.

Fatalism is another significant variable in most of the modernization studies. But once again the assumption is that the peasant in less developed countries is fatalistic and that fatalism is inconsistent with progressive orientation. However, those who equated fatalism with traditionalism have not proven the negative association between the former and economic development. On the other hand, Wharton (Weiner, 1966:264) refers to "a rapidly growing body of irrefutable evidence that peasant and subsistence farmers *are* indeed "economic men" who respond positively and negatively to economic stimuli as quickly as the most commercialized farmers in the modern world." He has effectively documented how subsistence farmers in Western

China, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia have adopted several staple crops which are not indigenous to these areas.

There is impressive evidence to suggest that the importance of fatalism in the process of modernization is grossly exaggerated. There seem to be two rational explanations for peasant fatalism:

1. Peasant fatalism is often a reflection of his perception of social reality. Farmers' inability to project the image of a doctor or engineer when confronted with the question of "what would you like your son to become?" is regarded as lack of educational aspiration and achievement motivation or "clear evidence" of their fatalism. Even though the question fails to make any distinction between one's pious wishes and legitimate expectations, the modern man has interpreted peasants' sense of realism as sense of fatalism.

2. Peasant fatalism is an *ex post facto* explanation for failures due to factors beyond his control. In other words, the farmer tends to take shelter under the fatalistic umbrella when intermittent droughts have dried his hopes or when recurring floods have washed off his ambition. Ruth Krulfeld's (1966) study of fatalism in Indonesia is significant for the conclusion that "fate is more commonly used as the after-the-fact explanation rather than an inhibiting factor, insofar as behavior is concerned." Moreover, Plath (1966), Eberhard (1966) and Ingersoll (1961) have effectively shown that farmers do not use fatalism as an excuse for inaction (see also Wharton, 1966) but try to do everything possible to manipulate fate and use fatalism only to justify their inability to combat forces of nature. In any

4. One wonders what would be the position on Lerner's empathy scale of a top manager of rational American bureaucracy who is confronted with the question: What would you do if you were to become the legendary magician of the Oceanic Islanders?

event, students of modernization have yet to prove how and to what extent fatalism impedes socio-economic development; the significant association between two variables — in this case fatalism and tradition — does not establish that antithetical relationship between two other variables.

REFERENCES

- Abraham, M. Francis
1973 *Dynamics of Leadership in Village India*, Allahabad: Indian International, (forthcoming).
- Apter, David E.
1965 *The Politics of Modernization*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Armer, Michael and Allan Schnaiberg
1972 "Measuring Individual Modernity," *American Sociological Review* 27 (June): 301-316.
- Armer, Michael and Robert Youts
1971 "Formal Education and Individual Modernity in an African Society," *American Journal of Sociology* 76: 604-626.
- Breese, Gerald
1966 *Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Briones, Guillermo and F. B. Waisanen
1966 "Educational Aspirations, Modernization and Urban Integration," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Miami Beach.
- Cochran, Thomas C.
1959 *The Puerto Rican Businessman*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Dahrendorf, Ralf
1959 *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Di Telia, Torcuato
1969 "Populism and Reform in Latin America," in Claudio Velis (ed.), *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Deutschmann, Paul J.
1963 "The Mass Media in An Underdeveloped Village," *Journalism Quarterly* 40: 27-35.
- Doob, Leonard W.
1967 "Scale for Assaying Psychological Modernization in Africa," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 31: 414-21.
- 1961 *Communication in Africa*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Eberhard, W.
1963 "Fatalism in the Life of the Common Man in Non-Communist China," *Anthropological Quarterly* (July).
- Eisenstadt, S. N.
1963 "The Need for Achievement," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 4: 420:32.
- 1964 "Process of Change and Institutionalization of the Political Systems of Centralized Empires." pp. 432-51. in George. K. Zollschan and Walter Hirsch (eds.), *Explorations in Social Change*, New York: Houghton Mifflin.
- 1966 *Modernization: Protest and Change*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Fairbank, John K., Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig
1965 *East Asia: The Modern Transformation*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

- Fals Borda, Orlanda : *Facts and Theory of Socio-cultural Change in a Rural Social System*, Bogota: National University of Colombia.
1962
- Fillol, Thomas Roberto : *Social Factors in Economic Development: The Argentine Case*.
1961 Cambridge: M. I. T. Press.
- Fliegel, Frederick C. : *Agricultural Innovations in Indian Villages*, Hyderabad:
Prodipto Roy, Lalit National Institute of Community Development.
K. Sen, and Joseph E.
Kivlin
1968
- Frank, Gunder A. : *Latin American: Underdevelopment or Revolution*, New York:
1969 Monthly Review Press.
- Frey, Frederick W. : "The Mass Media and Rural Development in Turkey," Cam-
1966 bridge: M. I. T. Center for International Studies, Rural
Development Research Report.
- Gerschenkron, "The Modernization of Entrepreneurship." pp. 246-257. in
Alexander Myron Weiner (ed.), *Modernization*, New York: Basic Books.
1966
- Gillin, John P. "Some Signposts for Policy" in Richard N. Adams, John P.
1960 Gillin, Allan R. Holmberg, Oscar Lewis, Richard W. Patch
and Charles Wagley, *Social Change in Latin America*, New
York: Vintage Books.
- Granick, David *The Red Executive*, Garden City: Doubleday.
1960
- Halpern, Manfred "The Character and Scope of the Social Revolution in the
1963 Middle East," pp. 7-23. in William R. Polk (ed.), *Developmental
Revolution*, Washinton, D. C.: The Middle East Institute.
- Hirschman, Albert O. "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and A Quasi-
1965 vanishing Act," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*.
XII: 4 (July) 385-93.
- 1958 *The Strategy of Economic Development*, New Haven: Yale
University Press.
- Horowitz, Irving *Masses in Latin America*, New York: Oxford University Press.
Louis (ed.)
1970
- 1972 *Three Worlds of Development*, New York: Oxford University
Press.
- Hoselitz, Bert (ed.) : *Economics and the Idea of Mankind*, New York: Columbia
1965 University Press.
- Hoselitz, Bert and *Industrialization and Society*, Paris: Unesco.
Wilbert M. Moore
1963
- Hunter, Guy : *Modernizing Peasant Societies*, New York: Oxford University
1969 Press.
- Huntington, Samuel P. : *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale Uni-
1968 versity Press.
- Hyman, Herber H. : "Research Design." in Robert E. Ward (ed.) *Studying Politics
1964 Abroad: Field Research in the Developing Areas*, Boston:
Little, Brown.

- Ingersoll, Jasper
1966 "Fatalism in Village Thailand," *Anthropological Quarterly* (July).
- Inkeles, Alex
1969 "Making Men Modern," *American Journal of Sociology* 75 (Sept.)
- Kahl, J. A.
1968 *The Measurement of Modernism: A Study of Values in Brazil and Mexico*, Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Krulfeld, Ruth
1966 "Fatalism in Indonesia: A Comparison of Socio-Religious Types on Lombok," *Anthropological Quarterly* (July).
- Kumar, Krishna
1970 "Ritual Caste Ranking and Modernization in India: A Study of Peasants in Six Villages," East Lansing: Michigan State University, unpublished Master's thesis.
- Kunkel, John H.
1965 "Values and Behavior in Economic Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XIII: 3, 257-277.
1970 *Society and Economic Growth*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lauer, Robert H.
1971 "The Scientific Legitimation of Fallacy: Neutralizing Social Change Theory," *American Sociological Review* 36 (October): 881-89.
- Lerner, Daniel
1958 *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, New York: Free Press.
1963 "Toward A Communication Theory of Modernization," in Lucien W. Pye (ed.) *Communication and Political Development*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Lerner, Daniel and :
David Riesman :
1955 "Self and Society: Reflections on Some Turks in Transition," *Explorations*, 5: 67-80
- Lerner, Daniel and :
Wilbur Schramm (eds.) :
1967 *Communication and Change in the Developing Countries*, Honolulu: East-West Center Press.
- Levy, Marion :
1966 *Modernization and the Structure of Societies*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1972 : *Modernization: Latecomers and Survivors*, New York: Basic Books.
- Lipset, Seymour
Martin
1967 "Values, Education, and Entrepreneurship." pp. 3-60 in Seymour Martin Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.) *Elites in Latin America*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Macklin, David B.
1969 'A Social-Psychological Perspective on Modernization" in Chandler Morse., Douglas E. Ashford, Frederick T. Bent, William H. Friedland, John W. Lewis and David B. Macklin, *Modernization by Design*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- McClelland, David C :
1961 *The Achieving Society*, Princeton: Van Nostrand.
1963 : "National Character and Economic Growth in Turkey and Iran," in Lucien W. Pye (ed.) *Communications and Political Development*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Moore Jr., Barrington:
1966 *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Boston: Beacon Press.
- Moore, Wilbert E. :
1963 *Social Change*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
1965 : *Impact of Industry*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

- Morse, Richard M. : *From Community to Metropolis*, Gainesville: University of
1958 Florida Press.
- Nettl, J. P. and : *International Systems and the Modernization of Societies*, New
Roland Robertson :
1968 York: Basic Books.
- Plath, D. W. : "Fatalism and its Ethics in Japan," *Anthropological Quarterly*,
1966 (duly).
- Pool, Ithiel de Sola : "The Mass Media and Politics in the Modernization Process."
1967 in Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm (eds.) *Communication
and Change in the Developing Countries*, Honolulu: East-West
Center Press.
- Pye, Lucien : *Communication and Political Development*, Princeton: Prin-
1963 ceton University Press.
- Rogers, Everett M. : *Modernization Among Peasants*, New York: Holt, Rinehart
1969 and Winston.
- Roy, Prodipto., : *Agricultural Innovation Among Indian Farmers*, Hyderabad:
Frédéric C. Fliegel, : National Institute of Community Development.
Joseph E. Kivlin and
Lalit K. Sen
1968
- Rostow, Walter W. : *Stages of Economic Growth*, New York: Cambridge Univer-
1960 sity Press.
1963 : *Economics of Take-off into Sustained Growth*, New York: St.
Martin's Press.
- Schnaiberg, Allan : "Measuring Modernism: Theoretical and Empirical Explora-
1970 tions," *American Journal of Sociology*, 76:399-425.
1971 : "The Modernizing Impact of Urbanization: A Casual Analysis."
Economic Development and Cultural Change 20 (October):
80-104.
- Schramm, Wilbur : *Mass Media and National Development*, Stanford, Stanford
1964 University Press.
- Smelser, Neil J. : "The Modernization of Social Relations," in Myron Weiner
1966 (ed.) *Modernization*, New York: Basic Books.
- Smith, Dick Horton, : "The OM Scale: A Comparative Socio-Psychological Measures
and Alex Inkeles : of Individual Modernity," *Sociometry* 29:353-377.
1966
- Srinivas, M. N. : *Caste in Modern India and Other Essays*, New York: Asis
1962 Publishing House.
1966 : *Social Change in Modern India*, Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press.
- Sunkel, Osvaldo : "Change and Frustration in Chile," in Claudio Veliz (ed.)
1969 *Obstacles to Change in Latin America*, New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
- Weiner, Myron (ed.) : *Modernization*, New York: Basic Books.
1966
- Weisskopf, W. A. : "Review of Achieving Society," *Journal of Political Economy*:
1962 LXX:3 (June) 311-13.
- Wharton, Jr., Clifton : "Modernizing Subsistence Agriculture," in Myron Weiner (ed.)
1966 *Modernization*, New York: Basic Books.
- Willems, Emilio : "The Structure of the Brazilian Family," *Social Forces*, 31:343.
1953